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1. Introduction
Mathematical models in ecological systems represent a long-time scrutinized area. In a
distributed-parameter version, they are essentially reaction-diffusion systems with right-
hand sides of certain special type forming the so-called Lotka-Volterra system. Original
studies of oscillation in biological or ecological systems (not necessarily in the presence
of diffusion) has been started by Lotka [14] and Volterra [28]. Depending on increas-
ing/decreasing behavior, this includes also the predator-prey system. To be more specific
we will use the model involving possibly a satiation, as used already e.g. by Freedman
[8], May [15], or Huang, Lu, Ruan [11], cf. also [16, Sect.3.3] for an ODE-variant. Let
us emphasize that the model with satiation is very realistic because it reflects the uni-
versal phenomenon that predators essentially do not hunt prey unless being hungry or
being threatened by hunger; humans are an exception but even their feeding capacity
is limited. Anyhow, in mathematical literature one can find both models with satiation
and simplified models without satiation, cf. e.g. Britton [2], Murray [16, Sect.12.2], Pao
[19, Sect.12.4], or also [27, Sect.12.3] or [29, System (4.1)] etc.. For this reason we shall
formulate our results to cover also no-satiation case. More general nonlinearities that
those we will employ in (1) can also be found, cf. e.g. [13, 29].
When having modelled such ecological systems, a natural (sometimes unfortunate)
ambition of mankind is to control them. This is typically much more difficult than mere
1
2modelling. An important phenomenon which can be exploited in various ways is convexity
of the cost functional. This is, however, not always guaranteed because the controlled
predator/prey ecological system is naturally nonlinear.
In this paper, we investigate this convexity property in a nontrivial context of non-
cooperative games where it is essential to ensure a mere existence of Nash equilibria.
It should be, however, remarked that the results concerning convexity analysis can be
directly exploited in conventional optimal control where it induces, e.g., sufficiency of
1st-order optimality conditions or global convergence of optimization routines to globally
optimal solutions.
In Section 2, we specify the predator/prey system and derive basic properties we will
need further. In Section 3 we specify the noncooperative game, perform the above-
mentioned convexity analysis, and eventually show existence of its Nash equilibria. Sec-
tion 4 deals with a conceptual discretization of the game, namely a time discretization
of the controlled predator/prey system and spatial discretization of the control variables,
and prove some sort of convergence. In Section 5 we introduced the full discretization
case and eventually, Section 6 presents an illustrative numerical example.
2. The controlled state system
We will consider a fixed bounded Lipschitz domain Ω ⊂ IRn where the game between the
predator species and the prey takes place, n ≤ 3 (although in most ecological applications
n = 2 can be supposed), and T > 0 a finite time horizon. We denote Q := (0, T )×Ω and
Σ := (0, T )×Γ, with Γ := ∂Ω the boundary of Ω. We consider the following predator-prey
model:
∂y
∂t
− d1∆y = ay
(
1− y
+
k
)
− b yz
+
1 + ey+
in Q,(1a)
∂z
∂t
− d2∆z = −cz + d yz
1 + ey+
in Q,(1b)
y = 0, z = 0 on Σ,(1c)
y(0, ·) = u, z(0, ·) = v in Ω,(1d)
where (·)+ denotes the non-negative part and, in fact, is only to avoid formal difficulties
in some proofs and is out of any effects for non-negative solutions in which we will be
interested so we are definitely authorized to define the right-hand side nonlinearities in
a whatever way we need. The unknown functions y = y(t, x) and z = z(t, x) are the
densities of the prey and the predator species, while the given functions u = u(x) ≥ 0
and v = v(x) ≥ 0 are the initial densities of them, respectively. The initial settings u and
v of the species into the environment area Ω will later be used as controls. The constants
in (1) have the following meaning:
d1, d2 > 0 are the diffusion coefficient related with migration,
a > 0 a growth factor for the prey species,
k > 0 the carrying capacity,
c > 0 a death rate for the predator in the absence of the prey species,
b, d > 0 the interaction rates,
3e ≥ 0 a parameter determining a satiation rate.
We use the standard notation for Lebesgue spaces Lp(Ω) of measurable functions on
Ω whose p-power is integrable. Further, as usual, H10 (Ω) denotes the Sobolev space of
functions whose distributional derivatives belong to L2(Ω) and whose traces on Γ vanishes;
let us agree that the norm in H10 (Ω) is ||y||H10 (Ω) := ||∇y||L2(Ω;IRn). We will also use the
Bochner spaces Lp(0, T ;X) of functions [0, T ]→ X measurable in Bochner’s sense whose
p-power is integrable and we will denote
W :=
{
y ∈ L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω));
∂y
∂t
∈ L2(0, T ;H−1(Ω))
}
.(2)
The conventional norms in the space X in question will be denoted by || · ||X , but instead
of || · ||Lp(Ω) we will write shortly || · ||p.
Proposition 2.1. Assume 0 ≤ u ≤ k, 0 ≤ v ≤ K a.e. in Ω. Then system (1) possesses
a unique solution (y, z) ∈ L∞(Q)2 ∩W2. To be more specific, it holds
0 ≤ y ≤ k, 0 ≤ z ≤ e( dk1+ek−c)+TK a.e. in Q(3)
and
0 ≤ z(t) ≤ e( dk1+ek−c)tK a.e. in Ω, ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, the dependence (u, v) 7→ (y, z) : L2(Ω)2 → L2(Q)2 is (weak,norm)-continuous.
Proof. Existence of a weak solution (y, z) to (1) can be proved, e.g., by a constructive
way by making a semi-explicit semi-discretization in time and a limit passage, as done in
Sect. 4 below. Let us now investigate its qualitative properties we will need later.
Now we prove that each weak solution (not only those obtained as a limit mentioned
above) is non-negative. Indeed, by testing (1a) by y−, we get
1
2
d
dt
||y−||22 + d1||∇y−||22 + b
∫
Ω
yy−z+
1 + ey+
dx = a||y−||22;(4)
note that ayy+y−/k = 0. From (4) we get ||y−||2 ≤ 0 by Gronwall’s inequality because
||u−||2 = 0 and the integral in the left-hand side of (4) is non-negative. Hence y ≥ 0
a.e. on Q.
Now, by testing (1a) by (y − k)+, we get
(5)
1
2
d
dt
||(y−k)+||22 + d1||∇(y−k)+||22 +
∫
Ω
ay
y+−k
k
(y−k)+ + by(y−k)
+z+
1 + ey+
dx = 0,
from which we get ||(y − k)+||2 ≤ 0 by Gronwall’s inequality because ||(u − k)+||2 = 0
and the integral in the left-hand side of (5) is non-negative. Hence y ≤ k a.e. in Q. Note
that the L∞-bound, namely 0 ≤ y ≤ k, is independent of z and that it holds for any weak
solution, not only that one obtained as a limit in Sect. 4.
Now we will prove z(t, x) ≥ 0 a.e. on Ω by testing (1b) by z−. This gives:
1
2
d
dt
||z−||22 + d2||∇z−||22 + c||z−||22 = d
∫
Ω
yzz−
1 + ey+
dx ≤ d k
1 + ek
||z−||22;(6)
note that we used 0 ≤ y ≤ k which has been already proved. From (6) we get ||z−||2 ≤ 0
by Gronwall’s inequality because ||v−||2 = 0. Hence z ≥ 0 a.e. in Q.
4By a substitution Z = e−λtz, the equation in (1b) transforms to
∂Z
∂t
− d2∆Z =
(
d
y
1 + ey+
− c− λ
)
Z.(7)
For λ = ( dk
1+ek
− c), we get Z(t) ≤ ||v||∞ a.e. in Ω, so that
z(t) ≤ e( dk1+ek−c)t||v||∞ a.e. in Ω, ∀ t∈ [0, T ]
and
z ≤ e( dk1+ek−c)+T ||v||∞ a.e. in Q.(8)
Again note that (8) holds for any weak solution, not only that one obtained as a limit in
Sect. 4.
To prove uniqueness of the solution to (1), we consider two weak solutions (y1, z1) and
(y2, z2) to the initial-boundary-value problem (1), subtract the corresponding equations
and test them by y1 − y2 and z1 − z2, respectively. This gives
1
2
d
dt
(
||y1 − y2||22 + ||z1 − z2||22
)
+ d1||∇(y1 − y2)||22(9)
+ d2||∇(z1 − z2)||22 +
∫
Ω
a
k
(
y1 + y2
)
(y1 − y2)2dx+ c||z1 − z2||22
= a||y1 − y2||22 −
∫
Ω
b
( y1z1
1 + ey1
− y2z2
1 + ey2
)
(y1 − y2)
+ d
( y1z1
1 + ey1
− y2z2
1 + ey2
)
(z1 − z2)
≤ a||y1 − y2||22 + b||y1||∞||z1 − z2||2||y1 − y2||2 + b||y1 − y2||2||z2||∞
+ d||y1||∞||z1 − z2||22 + d||y1 − y2||2||z2||∞||z1 − z2||2,
where we also used that the function y 7→ y/(1 + ey) : [0,+∞] → IR is Lipschitz with
the derivative bounded by 1, that y1, y2, z1, and z2 are non-negative and that y1 and z2
have upper bounds. Then, by Young’s and Gronwall’s inequalities, we get y1 − y2 = 0
and z1 − z2 = 0.
The (weak,weak)-continuous dependence of (y, z) on the initial conditions (u, v) as
a mapping L2(Ω)2 → W2 follows easily from the obtained a-priori estimates and the
uniqueness. Then Aubin-Lions’ theorem gives the compact embedding into L2(Q) and
thus the claimed mode of continuity. 2
3. The game
We will consider a two-player noncooperative game with the predator-prey system (1).
Each player is to control an initial condition in one of the equations (1a,b), having his/her
own goals expressed by the desired response as well as the cost of the species controlled
by this player. Let us agree that the 1st player will control the initial condition for the
prey while the 2nd player will control the predator and umax ≥ 0, vmax ≥ 0 will denote the
maximal allowed density of the initial setting of the prey and the predator, respectively;
the dependence of umax and umin on x may reflect territorial authorization for particular
players. Our game will have the form:
5
Find a Nash Equilibrium of
J1(y, z, u) :=
1
r
||u||rLr(Ω) +
β11
2
||y − y1,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))
+
β21
2
||z − z1,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) (1st player payoff)
J2(y, z, v) :=
1
r
||v||rLr(Ω) +
β12
2
||y − y2,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))
+
β22
2
||z − z2,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) (2nd player payoff)
where (y, z, u, v) satisfies (1) in the weak sense, (state system)
u ∈ U , (1st-player strategy constraints)
v ∈ V , (2nd-player strategy constraints)
(10)
where
U := {u∈L∞(Ω); 0 ≤ u ≤ umax}, V := {v∈L∞(Ω); 0 ≤ v ≤ vmax}.(11)
Remark 3.1. The functionals J1 and J2 chosen correspond to stabilization problems (see,
for instance, [10] for other numerical examples of stabilization type problems). Other type
of problems that could have been considered are controllability type problems (see, for
instance, [5], [6] and [7])) when we want to minimize the distance of our state solution at
the final time to a target state.
We remind (see Proposition 2.1) that y, z∈W2∩L∞(Q)2. We are supposing either r = 1
or r = 2, so that the respective terms in J1 and J2 represent a cost of the the species to be
initially “bought” or the usual L2-norm as conventionally used in mathematical setting,
respectively. The notation Hα(Ω) refers to the usual Sobolev-Slobodetski˘ı space normed
by
||y||Hα(Ω) :=
(∫
Ω
(
y(ξ)2 + α
∫
Ω
|y(x)− y(ξ)|2
|x− ξ|n+2α dx
)
dξ
)1/2
;(12)
in comparison with the conventional setting, we multiply the double-integral term in (12)
by α, which yields automatically || · ||Hα(Ω) = || · ||2 if α = 0. The functions
y`,d, z`,d ∈ L2(0, T ;H2α+²(Ω)), ² > 0,(13)
are desired profiles of the prey and the predator species from the viewpoint of the `-th
player. For α = 0, the payoffs J1 and J2 involve the conventional L
2(Q)-distance from
these desired profiles, while for α > 0 we take into account also some spatially nonlocal
interactions; let us point out that one can still admit sharp spatial interfaces in y`,d and
z`,d satisfying (13) if α < 1/4. We will employ this α advantageously to compensate
nonlinearity of the controlled system.
As standard, a Nash equilibrium (u∗, v∗) is understood to satisfy
Φ1(u
∗, v∗) = min
u∈U
Φ1(u, v
∗) & Φ2(u∗, v∗) = min
v∈V
Φ2(u
∗, v)(14)
where we denote
Φ1(u, v) := J1(y, z, u) , Φ2(u, v) := J2(y, z, v)(15)
with y = y(u, v) and z = z(u, v) solving (1).
6Usual arguments leading to existence of Nash equilibria always need convexity of the
payoff functionals Φ1(·, v) and Φ2(u, ·). This convexity is, however, not automatic because
the controlled system is nonlinear, but it may really hold if this nonlinearity is not dom-
inant (i.e. if a, b and d are small enough) and is compensated by uniform continuity of
the pay-offs.
We will prove this convexity by a second-order analysis of the payoffs. This technique
was essentially exposed in [9] to establish sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions;
see also [26] or, in the context of noncooperative games, also [24, 25]. Let us introduce
the Lagrange function for the `-th player:
L` :
(W ∩ L∞(Q))2 × U × V × (L∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) ∩H1(0, T ;L2(Ω)))2 −→ IR,
defined, for y ≥ 0, by
L`(y, z, u, v, p, q) :=
β1`
2
||y − y`,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) +
β2`
2
||z − z`,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))(16)
+
∫
Ω
(
(2−`)1
r
ur + (`−1)1
r
vr + up(0) + vq(0)− y(T )p(T )− z(T )q(T )
)
dx
+
∫
Q
(
∂p
∂t
y +
∂q
∂t
z − d1∇p · ∇y + p
(
ay
(
1− y
k
)− b yz
1 + ey
)
−d2∇q · ∇z + q
(
− cz + d yz
1 + ey
))
dxdt.
The adjoint system for the `-th player is [L`]
′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Let us denote its
solutions by p = p` and q = q`. Hence, in the classical formulation, p` and q` are to solve
the following system of linear parabolic equations with boundary and terminal conditions:
−∂p`
∂t
− d1∆p` = a(1− 2
k
y)p` + z
(dq` − bp`)
(1 + ey)2
+ β1`D
2α(y − y`,d) on Q,(17a)
−∂q`
∂t
− d2∆q` = −cq` − y bp` − dq`
1 + ey
+ β2`D
2α(z − z`,d) on Q,(17b)
p` = 0, q` = 0 on Σ,(17c)
p`(T, ·) = 0, q`(T, ·) = 0 on Ω,(17d)
where the linear operator D2α : Hα(Ω) → Hα(Ω)∗ denotes the Gaˆteaux differential of
the quadratic form y 7→ ||y||2Hα(Ω) : Hα(Ω) → IR. We have an explicit formula for the
operator of the “fractional derivative”, namely
[Dµy](x) = 2y(x) + 2µ
∫
Ω
y(x)− y(ξ)
|x− ξ|n+µ dξ,
cf. [1, Formula (2.14)]. Then, by the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the
formula for the Gaˆteaux differential of the payoffs:
(18) [Φ`]
′(u, v) = [L`]′(u,v)(y, z, u, v, p`, q`) =
(
(2−`)ur−1 + p`(0) , (`−1)vr−1 + q`(0)
)
with (y, z) being the response on (u, v) in question and (p`, q`) solves (17).
7Remark 3.2. (Omitting non-smoothness.) The important fact is that the controlled
system (1), hence implicitly also each payoff Φ`, involves nonlinearities which are non-
smooth in the arguments y and z at zero. Hence the formula (18) holds if y, z > 0
while in the opposite case it should be understood only to yield a formula for a relevant
directional derivative, but this is just what plays role. This is also why we allow to
simplify the Lagrangean (16) and the adjoint system (17) by treating (1) as if (·)+ were
not involved.
Lemma 3.3. (The adjoint states.) Let α < 1/2 and (13) hold. Then there is a
unique (p`, q`) ∈ H1(0, T ;L2(Ω))2 ∩ L∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω))2 solving (17).
Sketch of the proof. The existence of p`h and q`h can be proved by standards arguments,
based on the a-priori estimate obtained by testing (17a) and (17b) (in some approximate
variant, e.g., the Galerkin modification) by ∂
∂t
p` and
∂
∂t
q`, respectively, and then making
a limit passage. The mentioned test gives
∥∥∥∂p`
∂t
∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥∂q`
∂t
∥∥∥2
2
− d
dt
(d1
2
||∇p`||22 +
d2
2
||∇q`||22 +
c
2
||q`||22
)
(19)
≤ C(||p`||2 + ||q`||2)(∥∥∥∂p`
∂t
∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∂q`
∂t
∥∥∥
2
)
+β1`
∥∥D2α(y − y`,d)∥∥2∥∥∥∂p`∂t ∥∥∥2 + β2`∥∥D2α(z − z`,d)∥∥2∥∥∥∂q`∂t ∥∥∥2,
with C a constant depending on ||y||∞ and ||z||∞, from which we get by Young’s and
Gronwall’s inequalities the bounds of p` and q` in L
∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω))∩H1(0, T ;L2(Ω)). Re-
alize that, in (19),
∥∥D2α(y− y`,d)∥∥2 is indeed in L2(0, T ) because y ∈ L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) and
y`,d ∈ L2(0, T ;H2α+²(Ω)) with some ² positive, hence also y − y`,d ∈ L2(0, T ;H2α+²(Ω)),
and then D2α(y − y`,d) ∈ L2(Q) provided α ≤ 1/2 is assumed. The fact that D2α maps
H2α+²(Ω) into L2(Ω) can be seen simply from the estimate
∫
Ω
∣∣∣∣ ∫
Ω
v(x)− v(ξ)
|x− ξ|n+2α dξ
∣∣∣∣2dx = ∫
Ω
∣∣∣∣ ∫
Ω
v(x)− v(ξ)
|x−ξ|n/2+2α+² ·
1
|x−ξ|n/2−²dξ
∣∣∣∣2dx
≤
∫
Ω
(∫
Ω
|v(x)− v(ξ)|2
|x− ξ|n+4α+2²dξ
∫
Ω
1
|x− ξ|n−2²dξ
)
dx
≤
(
sup
x∈Ω
∫
Ω
1
|x− ξ|n−2²dξ
)∫
Ω×Ω
|v(x)− v(ξ)|2
|x− ξ|n+4α+2²dξdx < +∞,
where we used Ho¨lder’s inequality and the fact that
∫
Ω
|x− ξ|2²−ndξ is bounded indepen-
dently of x ∈ Ω.
The uniqueness can be easily proved in a way similar to that of the uniqueness of
solution of (y, z) proved in Proposition 2.1 (the proof is even simpler because of the
linearity of system (17)). 2
8The convexity analysis of Φ` is based on the 2nd-order differential of the Lagrange
function, for which we have obviously the following formulae:[
L`
]′′
(y,z)
(y, z, u, v, p, q)(y˜, z˜)2 = β1`||y˜||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) + β2`||z˜||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))(20a) ∫
Q
−2ap
k
y˜2 + (bp− dq)
( −2ez
(1 + ey)3
y˜2 +
2
(1 + ey)2
y˜ z˜
)
dxdt,
[
L`
]′′
(u,v)
(y, z, u, v, p, q)(u˜, v˜)2 = (r − 1)
∫
Ω
(2− `)|u|r−2u˜2 + (`− 1)|v|r−2v˜2dx,(20b)
provided y ≥ 0 a.e. on Q and, if y(t, x) = 0 then y˜(t, x) ≥ 0, cf. Remark 3.2. Note that
[L`]
′′
(u,v)(·, ·, ·, ·, p, q) is constant for r = 1 or r = 2.
Lemma 3.4. (Increment estimate.) For any (u, v), (u˜, v˜) ∈ U × V, it holds
Φ`(u˜, v˜)− Φ`(u, v)−
[
L`
]′
(u,v)
(y, z, u, v, p`, q`)(u˜− u, v˜ − v)(21)
≥ inf
0≤ŷ
0≤ẑ≤e(dk−e)+T vmax
1
2
[
L`
]′′
(y,z,u,v)
(ŷ, ẑ, ·, ·, p̂`, q̂`)(y˜−y, z˜−z, u˜−u, v˜−v)2
where (y, z, p`, q`) is the response to (u, v) and (y˜, z˜) is the response to (u˜, v˜), and (ŷ, ẑ, p̂`, q̂`)
corresponds to (û, v̂).
Proof. By using the state equation (1), the adjoint equation (17), and by-part integration
in time, we can see (cf. [24, Lemma 2.3]) that the left-hand side of (21) equals to∫
Q
Df`(y˜, z˜, y, z)dxdt+
∫
Ω
Dg`(u˜, v˜, u, v)dx+
∫
Q
p`DF (y˜, z˜, y, z) + q`DG(y˜, z˜, y, z)dxdt
where D denotes the remainder in the Taylor-expansion formula up to the 1st order term,
i.e.
DF (y˜, z˜, y, z) := F (y˜, z˜)− F (y, z)− F ′(y, z)(y˜ − y, z˜ − z)
DG(y˜, z˜, y, z) := G(y˜, z˜)−G(y, z)−G′(y, z)(y˜ − y, z˜ − z),
and F and G are the right-hand sides of (1a) and (1b), respectively, considered with (·)+
omitted, i.e. F (y, z) := ay(1 − y/k) − byz/(1 + ey) and G(y, z) := −cz + dyz/(1 + ey),
cf. Remark 3.2. Also, analogous meaning hasDf` for f`(y, z) :=
1
2
β1`||y−y`,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))+
1
2
β2`||z − z`,d||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)). Hence by a simple algebra
Df`(y˜, z˜, y, z) = β1`||y˜ − y||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) + β2`||z˜ − z||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)).(22)
As for Dg` , it involves g`(u, v) :=
1
r
(2−`)|u|r + 1
r
(`−1)|v|r so that
Dg` =
{
0 for r = 1,
(2− `)(u˜− u)2 + (`− 1)(v˜ − v)2 for r = 2.(23)
By Taylor expansion, |DG(y˜, z˜, y, z)| ≤ 12 sup |G′′(ŷ, ẑ)|(|y˜ − y|2 + |z˜ − z|2) and similar
estimates hold for |DF (y˜, z˜, y, z)|, where the supreme can be taken over all (ŷ, ẑ) that can
occur for controls ranging over U×V which, in view of (3) with (11), motivated the choice
of “inf” in (21). 2
9Remark 3.5. (Increment formula.) For the satiation rate e = 0 and for the con-
sidered exponents r = 1 or r = 2, the optimization system is bi-quadratic (i.e. has
quadratic payoff as well as quadratic nonlinearities in the controlled system) and then
L′′` (·, ·, ·, ·, p`, q`) is constant and we have a simple identity:
Φ`(u˜, v˜)− Φ`(u, v) =
[
L`
]′
(u,v)
(y, z, u, v, p`, q`)(u˜− u, v˜ − v)(24)
+
1
2
[
L`
]′′
(y,z,u,v)
(·, ·, ·, ·, p`, q`)(y˜−y, z˜−z, u˜−u, v˜−v)2;
see [26, Lemma 8].
Proposition 3.6. (Convexity of Φ`.) Let the constants in (1) be given with the
carrying capacity k sufficiently small, and let α ≤ 1/2 satisfies also
α
 ≥ 0 if n = 1,> 0 if n = 2,≥ 1/4 if n = 3.(25)
Then, for any y`d, z`d, ` = 1, 2, satisfying (13) and being sufficiently small in the norms of
L2(0, T ;H2α(Ω)), the functional Φ` is convex on U × V if also ||vmax||L∞(Ω) is sufficiently
small and if naturally umax(·) ≤ k on Ω.
Proof. The assumed smallness of k, umax and vmax guarantees y and z small in the norm
L∞(Q) (cf. Proposition 2.1 with K = ||vmax||L∞(Ω)). We can easily see that y and z can
be made small in the norm L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω)). Indeed, testing (1a) by y, we get
1
2
d
dt
||y||22 + d1||∇y||22 ≤ a||y||22(26)
so that by the Gronwall inequality we get ||y||L∞(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤
√
e2aT ||u||2 and then again
from (26) we get
||y||L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤
√
e2aT
2d1
||u||2
which shows that ||y||L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) must be small if ||u||2 (which is bounded by
√|Ω|||u||∞)
is small. Similarly, testing (1b) by z, one gets
1
2
d
dt
||z||22 + d2||∇z||22 + c||z||22 ≤ dk||z||22(27)
so that by the Gronwall inequality one gets ||z||L∞(0,T ;L2(Ω)) ≤
√
e2γT ||v||2 with γ :=
(dk − c)+ and then again from (27) we get
||z||L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤
√
e2γT
2d2
||v||2
which shows that ||z||L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) must be small if ||v||2 (which is bounded by
√|Ω|||v||∞)
is small. By the proof of Lemma 3.3, we have (p`, q`) bounded also in L
∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) and
then, if also y`d and z`d are sufficiently small, we obtain p` and q` small in L
∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω)),
10
cf. (19). In particular, we can assume the mentioned data qualification so strict that
||p`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤
1
2C(2/k + b+ 2be||z||∞) ,(28a)
||q`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤
1
2C(d+ 2de||z||∞)(28b)
is satisfied with C a constant from the estimate∫
Ω
py2 dx ≤ C||p||H10 (Ω)||y||2Hα(Ω).(29)
The estimate (29) holds due to the Ho¨lder inequality with Sobolev embeddings provided
α is sufficiently large, which here means (25). Note that, in case n = 3, H10 (Ω) ⊂ L6(Ω)
and Hα(Ω) ⊂ L6/(3−2α)(Ω) which, for α = 1/4, is just L12/5(Ω) so that 6−1 + (12/5)−1 +
(12/5)−1 = 1, which explains the last bound in (25).
Then, in view of (20), by using the Young inequality and (28), we can estimate:
[L`]
′′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p`, q`)(y˜, z˜)
2 ≥
(
1− 2aC
k
||p`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω))(30)
−C(b||p`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) + d||q`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω)))(2e||z||∞ + 1))||y˜||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))
+
(
1− bC||p`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) − dC||q`||L∞(0,T ;H10 (Ω))
)
||z˜||2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) ≥ 0.
Altogether, as always [L`]
′′
(u,v)(y, z, u, v, p`, q`)(u˜, v˜)
2 ≥ 0 because L`(y, z, ·, ·, p`, q`) is
convex, we can join (18) and (24) to obtain
Φ`(u˜, v˜)− Φ`(u, v)− [Φ′`(u, v)](u˜− u, v˜ − v) ≥ 0.(31)
Replacing the role of (u˜, v˜) and (u, v), we get also
Φ`(u, v)− Φ`(u˜, v˜)− [Φ′`(u˜, v˜)](u− u˜, v − v˜) ≥ 0.(32)
Summing (31) and (32), we get
(
[Φ′`(u˜, v˜)] − [Φ′`(u, v)]
)
(u˜ − u, v˜ − v) ≥ 0. As u˜, u ∈ U
and v˜, v ∈ V are arbitrary, we have thus proved monotonicity of Φ′` on U ×V . From this,
convexity of Φ` follows by a standard argument. 2
Existence of Nash equilibria [17] by the standard technique developed by Nikaidoˆ and
Isoda [18] would require the payoffs (separately) continuous with respect to compact
topologies on U and V , which is not compatible with usual norm or weak topologies on
these sets if r 6= 1. Alternatively, we could make a relaxation by means of Young measures,
prove existence in terms of mixed strategies, and then to show from the maximum principle
that each Nash equilibrium must be, in fact, composed from pure strategies (ranging over
the original sets U and V), cf. [23, Chapter 7] for this approach. We, however, choose even
a simpler technique based on the Schauder-type fixed-point theorem, which is even slightly
more constructive than [18] where, beside the Schauder theorem, also a non-constructive
selection by compactness argument and a contradiction argument are used.
Proposition 3.7. (Existence of Nash equilibria.) Under the conditions of Propo-
sition 3.6, the game (10) possesses at least one Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Any fixed point on U × V of the set-valued mapping
(u, v) 7→
(
ArgminUΦ1(·, v),ArgminVΦ2(u, ·)
)
(33)
where ArgminUΦ1(·, v) := {u ∈ U ; Φ1(u, v) = minΦ1(U , v)} and ArgminVΦ2(u, ·) being
defined analogously, is obviously a Nash equilibrium.
We will prove existence of such fixed point by Schauder-type theorem. As the inequal-
ities in (28) are not strict, we do not have strict convexity of the payoffs, hence (33)
can indeed be a set-valued mapping in general, and we are to use Kakutani’s general-
ization of Schauder’s theorem, which needs U × V to be convex and compact, and the
mapping (33) to be upper semicontinuous with closed convex values. These requirements
are valid if a weak*-L∞(Ω) topology is taken on both U and V . Indeed, the convexity
of ArgminUΦ1(·, v) follows from the convexity of U and of Φ1(·, v) proved in Proposi-
tion 3.6. Furthermore, this topology makes Φ1(·, v) lower semicontinuous and Φ1(u, ·)
is even continuous because u does not occur explicitly in Φ1, cf. (10). To show the
upper semicontinuity of the set-valued mapping v 7→ ArgminUΦ1(·, v), let us take a se-
quence {vk} converging weakly to v and a sequence {uk} weakly convergent to u and
uk ∈ ArgminUΦ1(·, vk), i.e.
Φ1(uk, vk) ≤ Φ1(u˜, vk)(34)
for all u˜ ∈ U . Making a limit passage, by lower semicontinuity of Φ` and upper semicon-
tinuity of Φ`(u˜, ·), we get
Φ1(u, v) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
Φ1(uk, vk) ≤ lim sup
k→∞
Φ1(u˜, vk) ≤ Φ1(u˜, v),(35)
which says that u ∈ ArgminUΦ1(·, v). Hence, the upper semicontinuity of the mapping
v 7→ ArgminUΦ1(·, v)
is shown. The case of u 7→ ArgminVΦ2(u, ·) is analogous. 2
4. Conceptual approximation scheme
To implement the above game computationally, one needs to discretize the controlled
system (1). This can be made by various ways, but one option is of a special interest:
a suitable semi-explicit formula in time which would guarantee all previous estimates
(i.e. stability and non-negativity of approximate solutions) and simultaneously would yield
linear problems at each time level so that it allows for exact solutions to the discretized
system. This is important especially in context of optimization where usage of iterative
solvers would lead to inaccuracy also in the calculated gradient of Φ` (i.e. in solution
to the corresponding discrete adjoint problem) which would eventually make troubles in
optimization routines which are usually very sensitive to any inaccuracy in the calculated
gradient. To demonstrate the main features in an easy-to-observe way, we present only
a conceptual discretization in time, keeping the spatial variable x continuous; this semi-
discretization in time is sometimes called Rothe’s method if made in a fully implicit way
(which is not our case, however).
We consider the time discretization step τ , defined by τ = T/N , where N is a positive
integer. Besides, we take some finite-dimensional subsets Uh ⊂ U and Vh ⊂ V where h > 0
is a discretization parameter, assuming naturally that these sets are nested for h↘ 0 and
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that
⋃
h>0 Uh and
⋃
h>0 Vh are Lr(Ω)-dense in U and V , respectively. Moreover, we assume
these sets to be weakly closed; an example is a discretization of both U and V with piece-
wise constant controls on a finite-volume discretization of Ω. We approximate then the
Nash Equilibrium problem (10) by the following semi-discretized problem:
(36)

Find a Nash Equilibrium of
J1,τ (y, z, u) :=
1
r
∫
Ω
urdx+ τ
N∑
i=1
β11
2
∥∥yiτ − yi1,d,τ∥∥2Hα(Ω) + β212 ∥∥ziτ − zi1,d,τ∥∥2Hα(Ω)
J2,τ (y, z, v) :=
1
r
∫
Ω
vrdx+ τ
N∑
i=1
β12
2
∥∥yiτ − yi2,d,τ∥∥2Hα(Ω) + β222 ∥∥ziτ − zi2,d,τ∥∥2Hα(Ω)
where (u, v) ∈ Uh × Vh and y = {yiτ}Ni=1 and z = {ziτ}Ni=1 solve (37)–(38):
yiτ − yi−1τ
τ
− d1∆yiτ = yi−1τ a
(
1− y
i
τ
k
)
− b y
i
τz
i−1
τ
1 + eyi−1τ
in Ω,
yiτ = 0 on Γ,
(37a)

ziτ − zi−1τ
τ
− d2∆ziτ = zi
(
− c+ d y
i
τ
1 + eyiτ
)
in Ω,
ziτ = 0 on Γ,
(37b)
for i = 1, ..., N , while for i = 0 we consider
y0 = u, z0 = v.(38)
Here, in the general case, yi`,d,τ :=
1
τ
∫ iτ
(i−1)τ y`,d(t)dt and similarly z
i
`,d,τ :=
1
τ
∫ iτ
(i−1)τ z`,d(t)dt.
Let us remark that, if y`,d, z`,d ∈ C([0, T ];Hα(Ω)), we could take alternatively yi`,d,τ =
y`,d(iτ) and z
i
`,d,τ = z`,d(iτ). Let us denote by yτ ∈ C(0, T ;L∞(Ω))∩H10 (Ω) the piecewise
affine interpolation between y0, y1, ..., yN , and by y¯τ ∈ L∞(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) the piecewise
constant interpolation of y1, y2, ..., yN , i.e. y¯τ (t) = y
i
τ for t ∈ ((i− 1)τ, iτ) (the regularity
for yτ and y¯τ is proved in the Lemma below). The notation zτ and z¯τ will have an
analogous meaning.
Lemma 4.1. If τ < 1/( dk
1+ek
− c)+, the elliptic problems in (37) have unique solutions
(yiτ , z
i
τ ) ∈ (L∞(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))2 for all i = 1, · · · , N , which satisfy 0 ≤ yiτ ≤ k and 0 ≤ ziτ ≤
(1 + τ(c− dk
1+ek
))−iK provided 0 ≤ u ≤ k and 0 ≤ v ≤ K.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We use an induction argument. Let us suppose yi−1τ , z
i−1
τ ∈ L∞(Ω)
are nonnegative and satisfy 0 ≤ yi−1τ ≤ k and 0 ≤ zi−1τ ≤ (1 + τ(c− dk1+ek ))−(i−1)K. Then,
we have to prove that yiτ , z
i
τ satisfy the same hypothesis and also that y
i
τ , z
i
τ ∈ H10 (Ω).
Obviously, (37a) is a linear boundary-value problem for yiτ whose solution, in a weak
sense, is defined by the integral identity
(39)
∫
Ω
(1
τ
+ a
yi−1τ
k
+
bzi−1τ
1 + eyi−1τ
)
yiτϕ+ d1∇yiτ · ∇ϕ dx =
∫
Ω
(1
τ
+ a
)
yi−1τ ϕ dx
to be valid for all ϕ ∈ H10 (Ω). It is clear that, if yi−1τ , zi−1τ ∈ L∞(Ω) are non-negative,
the left-hand side of (39) defines a continuous and positive bilinear form on H10 (Ω) and
the right-hand side defines a continuous linear form on H10 (Ω). Therefore, by classical
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Lax-Milgram theorem, it possesses a unique solution yiτ ∈ H10 (Ω). Let us see that yiτ is
non-negative. Testing (39) by (yiτ )
− one gets
(40)
1
τ
∥∥(yiτ )−∥∥22 + d1∥∥∇(yiτ )−∥∥22 ≤ ∫
Ω
(1
τ
+ a
)
yi−1τ (y
i
τ )
− dx ≤ 0.
Hence, we get (yiτ )
− = 0 and therefore yiτ ≥ 0 a.e. in Ω. Let us prove that yiτ ≤ k. To do
it, we write (37a) in the following equivalent way:
(41)

(yiτ − k)− (yi−1τ − k)
τ
− d1∆yiτ = yi−1τ a
(
1− y
i
τ
k
)
− b y
i
τz
i−1
τ
1 + eyi−1τ
in Ω,
yiτ = 0 on Γ.
Then, testing by (yiτ − k)+ we get∥∥(yiτ − k)+∥∥22 + τd1∥∥∇(yiτ − k)+∥∥22 = ∫
Ω
[
(yi−1τ − k)(yiτ − k)+
−τ
(
ayi−1τ
yiτ − k
k
(yiτ − k)+ + b
yiτ (y
i
τ − k)+zi−1τ
1 + eyi−1τ
)]
dx ≤ 0
since 0 ≤ yi−1τ ≤ k, 0 ≤ yiτ and zi−1τ ≥ 0. Hence, yiτ ≤ k a.e. in Ω.
Now, (37b) is a linear boundary-value problem for ziτ whose solution, in a weak sense,
is defined by the integral identity
(42)
∫
Ω
(1
τ
+ c− d y
i
τ
1 + eyiτ
)
ziτϕ+ d2∇ziτ · ∇ϕ dx =
∫
Ω
zi−1τ
τ
ϕ dx
to be valid for all ϕ ∈ H10 (Ω). Further, if 0 ≤ yi−1τ ≤ k a.e. and τ < 1/( dk1+ek − c)+
(this bound can be improved a little by using Poincare´’s inequality), the left hand side
of (42) defines a continuous and positive bilinear form on H10 (Ω). Therefore, by classical
Lax-Milgram theorem, it possesses a unique solution ziτ ∈ H10 (Ω). Let us see that ziτ is
non-negative. Testing (42) by (ziτ )
− one gets
(43)
(1
τ
+ c− dk
)∥∥(ziτ )−∥∥22 + d2∥∥∇(ziτ )−∥∥22 ≤ ∫
Ω
zi−1τ
τ
(ziτ )
− dx ≤ 0
Hence, if τ < 1/( dk
1+ek
− c)+, we get (ziτ )− = 0 and therefore ziτ ≥ 0 a.e. in Ω.
Finally, let us prove the upper bound for ziτ . To do it, we look for an arbitrary constant
M > 0 such that ziτ ≤M . We write (37b) in the following equivalent way:
(44)

(ziτ −M)− (zi−1τ −M)
τ
− d2∆ziτ = ziτ
(
− c+ d y
i
τ
1 + eyiτ
)
in Ω,
ziτ = 0 on Γ.
Then, testing by (ziτ −M)+ we get(1
τ
+ c− dk
1 + ek
)∥∥(ziτ −M)+∥∥22 + d2∥∥∇(ziτ −M)+∥∥22
≤
∫
Ω
[1
τ
(zi−1τ −M) +M
( dk
1 + ek
− c)](ziτ −M)+dx.
Let us see that we can choose M such that
1
τ
(zi−1τ −M) +M
( dk
1 + ek
− c
)
≤ 0 a.e.in Ω,
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which is equivalent to
(45) M
(1
τ
+ c− dk
1 + ek
)
≥ ‖z
i−1
τ ‖∞
τ
.
Now, a necessary condition for (45) is
1
τ
>
( dk
1 + ek
− c
)+
,
which is true by hypothesis. Then, (45) is equivalent to
(46) M ≥ ‖z
i−1
τ ‖∞
τ (1/τ + c− dk/(1+ek)) .
Under these conditions, we have 0 ≤ ziτ ≤M and therefore
0 ≤ ziτ ≤
(
1 + τ
(
c− dk
1+ek
))−i
K.
2
Remark 4.2. The bound in Lemma 4.1 for ziτ is a discrete version of the one in Propo-
sition 2.1 for z(t), in the following way: Let us fix for instance t = T , so that Nτ = T .
Then,
zNτ ≤
(
1 + τ
(
c− dk
1 + ek
))−N
K
and
lim
N→+∞
(
1 + τ
(
c− dk
1 + ek
))−N
= lim
N→+∞
(
1 +
T
(
c− dk
1+ek
)
N
)−N
= eT (
dk
1+ek
−c).
Lemma 4.3. If τ < 1/( dk
1+ek
− c)+, the following a-priori estimates hold:∥∥(y¯τ , z¯τ )∥∥L∞(Q)2 ∩L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω))2 ≤ C, ∥∥∥(∂yτ∂t , ∂zτ∂t )∥∥∥L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))2 ≤ C(47)
with C > 0. Further, if τ ∈ (0, ( dk
1+ek
− c)+ − ε), with ε > 0, then C is independent of τ .
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Since 0 ≤ yiτ ≤ k a.e. in Ω, for i = 0, · · · , N , it is clear that
‖y¯τ‖L∞(Q) ≤ C, with C independent of τ . Furthermore,
ziτ ≤
(
1 + τ
(
c− dk
1 + ek
))−i
K
≤
{ (
1− τ( dk
1+ek
− c))−Tτ K if dk
1+ek
− c ≥ 0
K if dk
1+ek
− c ≤ 0
}
τ→0−→ eT ( dk1+ek−c)+K,
which implies that ‖z¯τ‖L∞(Q) ≤ C, with C independent of τ .
Now, testing (39) by yiτ and using Young’s inequality we have
1
2τ
∥∥yiτ∥∥22 + d1∥∥∇yiτ∥∥22 ≤ ∫
Ω
( 1
2τ
+
a
2
)
(yi−1τ )
2 +
∫
Ω
a
2
(yiτ )
2 dx.
Then, multiplying it by τ and summing for i = 1, ..., N , we obtain
1
2
∥∥yN∥∥2
2
+ d1
∥∥y¯τ∥∥2L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤ 12‖u‖22 + τ a2
N∑
i=1
∫
Ω
(
(yi−1τ )
2 + (yiτ )
2
)
dx
≤ 1
2
‖u‖22 + Tak2|Ω|,
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which implies that ‖y¯τ‖L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤ C, with C independent of τ .
Now, testing (42) by ziτ and using Young inequality we have
1
τ
‖ziτ‖22 + d2‖∇ziτ‖22 ≤
∫
Ω
(zi−1τ
τ
ziτ +
(− c+ d yiτ
1 + eyiτ
)
(ziτ )
2
)
dx
≤ 1
2τ
‖zi−1τ ‖22 +
1
2τ
‖zi−1τ ‖22 +
( dk
1 + ek
− c
)
‖ziτ‖22
and
1
2τ
‖ziτ‖22 + d2‖∇ziτ‖22 ≤
1
2τ
‖zi−1τ ‖22 +
( dk
1 + ek
− c
)
‖ziτ‖22.
Then, multiplying by τ and summing for i = 1, ..., N , we obtain
1
2
‖zN‖22 + d2‖z¯τ‖2L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤
1
2
‖v‖22 +
( dk
1 + ek
− c
)
‖z¯τ‖2L2(Q),
which implies that ‖z¯τ‖L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤ C, with C independent of τ . Now,∥∥∥∂yτ
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))
=
∫ T
0
sup
‖ϕ‖
H10(Ω)
=1
(〈∂yτ
∂t
, ϕ
〉
H−1(Ω)×H10 (Ω)
)2
dt
= τ
N∑
i=1
sup
‖ϕ‖
H10(Ω)
=1
(∫
Ω
yiτ − yi−1τ
τ
ϕdx
)2
.
Then, from (39), we have that∥∥∥∂yτ
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))
= τ
N∑
i=1
sup
‖ϕ‖
H10(Ω)
=1
[ ∫
Ω
−d1∇yiτ · ∇ϕ
+
(
ayi−1τ
(
1− y
i
τ
k
)− b yiτzi−1τ
1 + eyi−1τ
)
ϕ dx
]2
≤ 3
[
d21‖y¯τ‖2L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) + a
2k2T |Ω|+ b2k2‖z¯τ‖2L∞(Q)T |Ω|
]
,
which implies that ‖yτ‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) ≤ C, with C independent of τ .
Finally, from (42), we have that∥∥∥∂zτ
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))
= τ
N∑
i=1
sup
‖ϕ‖
H10(Ω)
=1
(∫
Ω
ziτ − zi−1τ
τ
ϕdx
)2
= τ
N∑
i=1
sup
‖ϕ‖
H10(Ω)
=1
[∫
Ω
−d2∇ziτ · ∇ϕ − ziτ
(
c− d y
i
τ
1+eyiτ
)
ϕ dx
]2
≤ 2d22‖z¯τ‖2L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω)) + 2
(
c+
dk
1 + ek
)2
‖z¯τ‖2L∞(Q)T |Ω|,
which implies that ‖zτ‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) ≤ C, with C independent of τ . 2
For further purposes, we need also to involve a continuous dependence on the initial
conditions. This is, however, just a simple extension of the convergence proof. For this
purpose, let us consider another parameter h > 0 and sequences {uh}h>0 ⊂ U with
uh ∈ Uh and {vh}h>0 ⊂ V with vh ∈ Vh converging for h↘ 0 weakly in Lr(Ω) to u and v,
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respectively, and denote by (yτ,h, zτ,h) solution to the approximate system (37) with the
initial conditions y0 = uh and z
0 = vh instead of (38).
Lemma 4.4. For τ, h↘ 0, y¯τ,h → y and z¯τ,h → z strongly in L2(0, T ;Hα(Ω)), and (y, z)
solves (1).
Proof. There is a “technical” difficulty that yτ,h, zτ,h 6∈ L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) if uh, vh ∈ L2(Ω) \
H10 (Ω). To overcome it, let us introduce the auxiliary function ŷτ,h ∈ C(0, T ;H10 (Ω))
which is constant on [0, τ ] and coincides with yτ,h on [τ, T ]. The analogous meaning has
ẑτ,h. The bounds obtained in the proof of Lemma 4.3 say that the sequence {(ŷτ,h, ẑτ,h)}
is bounded in W2 for τ > 0 small enough.
We will need also the “retarded” function y¯τ,h(.− τ), denoted by y¯Rτ,h; of course, we put
naturally y¯Rτ,h(t) := uh for t < τ . The function z¯
R
τ,h is defined analogously.
We can choose a subsequence such that (ŷτ,h, ẑτ,h) → (ŷ, ẑ) weakly in W2, and also
(yτ,h, zτ,h)→ (y, z) weakly in L2(Q)2, and (y¯τ,h, z¯τ,h)→ (y¯, z¯) weakly in L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω))2,
and (y¯Rτ,h, z¯
R
τ,h)→ (y¯R, z¯R) weakly in L2(Q)2.
Due to ‖ŷτ,h−yτ,h‖L2(Q) =
√
τ/3‖uh−y1τ,h‖L2(Ω) = O(
√
τ), we can claim that ŷ = y. By
a similar argument, also ẑ = z. As ‖y¯τ,h−yτ,h‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) =
√
τ/3‖ ∂
∂t
yτ,h‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) =
O(√τ), we have also y¯ = y. Similarly also z¯ = z. Likewise, ‖y¯τ,h − y¯Rτ,h‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) =√
τ‖ ∂
∂t
yτ,h‖L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) = O(
√
τ), we have also y¯R = y¯ = y, and similarly also z¯R = z.
Because of the compact embedding H10 (Ω) ⊂ Hα(Ω), by Aubin-Lions’s theorem, the
convergence (ŷτ,h, ẑτ,h)→ (y, z) is strong in L2(0, T ;Hα(Ω))2. As ‖ŷτ,h − y¯τ,h‖L2(0,T ;H10 (Ω))
is obviously bounded and
‖ŷτ,h−y¯τ,h‖2L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω)) =
τ
3
∥∥∥∂yτ,h
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(τ,T ;H−1(Ω))
≤ τ
3
∥∥∥∂yτ,h
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))
≤ τC
3
(48)
with C from (47), and as Hα(Ω) is an interpolation space between H10 (Ω) and H
−1(Ω) in
the sense that, for all v ∈ Hα(Ω),
‖v‖Hα(Ω) ≤ C‖v‖(1+α)/2H10 (Ω) ‖v‖
(1−α)/2
H−1(Ω)(49)
for some C, we obtain
‖ŷτ,h − y¯τ,h‖L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) = O
(
τ (1−α)/4
)
,(50)
from which one can claim that also y¯τ,h → y strongly in L2(0, T ;Hα(Ω)). By analogous
arguments, also z¯τ,h → z strongly in L2(0, T ;Hα(Ω)).
Now we are to prove that (y, z) solves (1). In terms of the introduced functions yτ,h,
y¯τ,h, y¯
R
τ,h, zτ,h, z¯τ,h, and z¯
R
τ,h, the scheme (37) can be written down in a “compact” form
as
∂yτ,h
∂t
− d1∆y¯τ,h = ay¯Rτ,h
(
1− y¯τ,h
k
)
− b y¯τ,hz¯
R
τ,h
1 + ey¯Rτ,h
on Q,(51a)
∂zτ,h
∂t
− d2∆z¯τ,h = −cz¯τ,h + d y¯τ,hz¯τ,h
1 + ey¯τ,h
on Q,(51b)
y¯τ,h = 0, z¯τ,h = 0 on Σ,(51c)
yτ,h(0, ·) = uh, zτ,h(0, ·) = vh on Ω.(51d)
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We already know that (y¯τ,h, z¯τ,h)→ (y, z) strongly in L2(Q). Like (48), we have also
‖y¯τ,h−y¯Rτ,h‖2L2(τ,T ;H−1(Ω)) = τ
∥∥∥∂yτ,h
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(τ,T ;H−1(Ω))
≤ τ
∥∥∥∂yτ,h
∂t
∥∥∥2
L2(0,T ;H−1(Ω))
≤ τC
and also ‖y¯τ,h−y¯Rτ,h‖L2(τ,T ;H10 (Ω)) ≤ 2C with C from (47); note that the last estimate can
not hold in L2(0, T ;H10 (Ω)) if uh ∈ L2(Ω)\H10 (Ω). Using the fact that L2(Ω) is interpolant
between H10 (Ω) and H
−1(Ω), cf. (49) for α = 0, we obtain ‖y¯τ,h−y¯Rτ,h‖L2(τ,T ;L2(Ω)) = O(
√
τ)
so that
‖y¯τ,h−y¯Rτ,h‖2L2(Q) = τ‖y1τ,h − u‖2L2(Ω) + ‖y¯τ,h−y¯Rτ,h‖2L2(τ,T ;L2(Ω)) = O(τ)(52)
because obviously ‖uh − y1τ,h‖L2(Ω) ≤ 2C with C from (47). Therefore, we can claim that
also y¯Rτ,h → y strongly in L2(Q). By analogous arguments, also z¯Rτ,h → z strongly in L2(Q).
This allows us already to make limit passage in (51). Note that the nonlinearity IR2+×
IR2 → IR2: (y, y′, z, z′) 7→ (ay′(1− y/k)− byz′/(1 + ey′),−cz + dyz/(1 + ey)) has at most
quadratic growth so that, by continuity of the respective Nemytski˘ı mapping L2(Q)4 →
L1(Q)2 if restricted to nonnegative arguments y’s, the right-hand sides of (51a,b) converge
strongly in L1(Q) to ay(1 − y/k) − byz/(1 + ey) and −cz + dyz/(1 + ey), respectively.
The limit passage in the left-hand-side terms in (51a,b) is obvious because they are linear.
Note that the mapping y 7→ y(0, ·) :W → L2(Ω) is (weak,weak)-continuous which allows
to pass to the limit in the initial conditions (51d).
Due to uniqueness of the weak solution to (1), the whole sequence {(y¯τ,h, z¯τ,h)}τ>0
converges. 2
We could now do the analysis of convexity analogous to Proposition 3.6 for the discrete
game (36). This would incorporate only a lot of work but not new ideas. Therefore, we
will rather base further considerations only on convexity of the continuous problem. To
do that, the continuous game (10) can be exploited in some extent. Let us still introduce
the notation y¯`,d,τ (t, x) = y
i
`,d,τ (x) for (i− 1)τ < t < iτ , z¯`,d,τ is defined analogously, and
Φ1,τ (u, v) := J1,τ (y¯τ , z¯τ , u), Φ2,τ (u, v) := J2,τ (y¯τ , z¯τ , v),(53)
where (y¯τ , z¯τ ) = (y¯τ , z¯τ )(u, v) is the solution to (37) and where J1,τ and J2,τ is just as J1
and J2 but with y`,d,τ and z`,d,τ instead of y`,d and z`,d, respectively, i.e.
J1,τ (y, z, u) =
1
r
‖u‖rLr(Ω) +
β11
2
∥∥y−y1,d,τ∥∥2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) + β212 ∥∥z−z1,d,τ∥∥2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω))(54)
J2,τ (y, z, v) =
1
r
‖v‖rLr(Ω) +
β12
2
∥∥y−y2,d,τ∥∥2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)) + β222 ∥∥z−z2,d,τ∥∥2L2(0,T ;Hα(Ω)).(55)
We point out that these functionals are the same as those defined in (36).
For a tolerance ε > 0 we say that a couple (u∗, v∗) is an ε-solution of the approximate
game if
(u∗, v∗) ∈ Uh × Vh : ∀u ∈ Uh : Φ1,τ (u∗, v∗) ≤ Φ1,τ (u, v∗) + ε(56)
∀v ∈ Vh : Φ2,τ (u∗, v∗) ≤ Φ2,τ (u∗, v) + ε
Obviously, existence of such an ε-solution is trivial if ε is sufficiently large but then the
relevance with the original game is rather lost. Hence, it is important to have a chance
to push ε to zero:
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Proposition 4.5. There is a function E = E(τ, h) > 0 such that limτ→0,h→0E(τ, h) = 0
and, for any τ > 0, h > 0, ε ≥ E(τ, h), there is an ε-solution (u∗τ,h,ε, v∗τ,h,ε) to (56).
Moreover, any sequence of such ε-solutions obtained by pushing (τ, h, ε) to zero under
the “stability condition” ε ≥ E(τ, h) contains an Lr(Ω)2-weakly convergent subsequence,
i.e. (in terms of the same indices),
w-lim
τ,h,ε→0
ε≥E(τ,h)
(u∗τ,h,ε, v
∗
τ,h,ε) = (u
∗, v∗)(57)
and any (u∗, v∗) obtained by such way solves the original game (56).
Proof. The first terms in (54)–(55) are uniformly continuous on U and on V . Let us denote
the remaining terms in (54)–(55) by Φ01,τ (u, v) := Φ1,τ (u, v)− 1r‖u‖rLr(Ω) and Φ02,τ (u, v) :=
Φ2,τ (u, v)− 1r‖v‖rLr(Ω). Similarly, we put Φ01(u, v) := Φ1(u, v)− 1r‖u‖rLr(Ω) and Φ02(u, v) :=
Φ2(u, v)− 1r‖v‖rLr(Ω).
We proved before that the functionals Φ0` are L
r(Ω)-weakly continuous on the compact
set U ×V , hence they are uniformly continuous. Then they remain uniformly continuous
in the Lr(Ω)-strong uniformity; let m` denote the modulus of continuity in the sense that
|Φ1(u, v)−Φ1(u˜, v˜)| ≤ |Φ01(u, v)−Φ01(u˜, v˜)|+ 1r‖u−u˜‖rLr(Ω) ≤ m1(‖u−u˜‖Lr(Ω)+‖v−v˜‖Lr(Ω)),
and similar estimate holds for Φ2, too.
Let E`(τ) := max(u,v)∈U×V |Φ`,τ (u, v) − Φ`(u, v)| = max(u,v)∈U×V |Φ0`,τ (u, v) − Φ0`(u, v)|.
By Lemma 4.4, we have limτ→0 E`(τ) = 0.
Let us still denote EUh = maxu∈U minu˜∈Uh ‖u− u˜‖Lr(Ω), and analogous meaning has EVh .
Our approximation assumption ensures limh→0 EUh = 0 and limh→0 EVh = 0.
Let us consider a solution (u∗, v∗) to the original game (56) and take (uh, vh) ∈ Uh×Vh
such that ‖uh − u∗‖Lr(Ω) ≤ EUh and ‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω) ≤ EVh .
Then, for all u ∈ U , it holds
Φ1,τ (uh, vh) ≤ Φ1(uh, vh) + E1(τ)
≤ Φ1(u∗, v∗) + E1(τ) +m1
(‖uh − u∗‖Lr(Ω) + ‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
≤ Φ1(u, v∗) + E1(τ) +m1
(‖uh − u∗‖Lr(Ω)+‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
≤ Φ1(u, vh) + E1(τ) +m1
(‖uh − u∗‖Lr(Ω)+‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
+m1
(‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
≤ Φ1,τ (u, vh) + 2E1(τ) + 2m1
(‖uh − u∗‖Lr(Ω)+‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
+m1
(‖vh − v∗‖Lr(Ω))
≤ Φ1,τ (u, vh) + 2E1(τ) + 2m1
(EUh +EVh ).
Similarly, one can get Φ2,τ (uh, vh) ≤ Φ2,τ (uh, v) + 2E2(τ) + 2m2
(EUh + EVh ) for any v ∈ V .
Thus, in particular, considering (u, v) ∈ Uh × Vh only, we can see that (uh, vh) is an
ε-solution to the approximate game (56) for
ε ≥ E(τ, h) := 2max
`=1,2
(
E`(τ) +m`
(EUh + EVh )).(58)
Furthermore, let us take (u∗τ,h,ε, v
∗
τ,h,ε) ∈ Uh × Vh with the above specified properties,
i.e. Φ1,τ (u
∗
τ,h,ε, v
∗
τ,h,ε) ≤ Φ1,τ (u, v∗τ,h,ε) + ε and Φ2,τ (u∗τ,h,ε, v∗τ,h,ε) ≤ Φ2,τ (u∗τ,h,ε, v) + ε for all
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(u, v) ∈ Uh × Vh. Passing to the limit with (τ, h, ε) → 0, having in mind a subsequence
satisfying (57) we obtain
Φ1(u
∗, v∗) ≤ Φ1(u, v∗) and Φ2(u∗, v∗) ≤ Φ2(u∗, v)(59)
for any (u, v) ∈ Uh × Vh with h > 0 arbitrary. Note that we employed also y`,d,τ → y`,d
and z`,d,τ → z`,d in the norm of L2(0, T ;Hα(Ω)), and the weak lower semicontinuity of Φ`
and also the strong continuity of Φ`. By the strong continuity of both Φ1 and Φ2, (59)
holds for any (u, v) ∈ U × V . 2
For simplicity of notation, from now on we denote yi := yiτ , z
i := ziτ , y
i
l,d := y
i
l,d,τ and
zil,d := z
i
l,d,τ . Now, for the time discretized problem, the Lagrange function for the `-th
player is the function
L`,τ : (H
1
0 (Ω)
N ∩ L∞(Ω)N)2 × U × V × (H10 (Ω)N)2 −→ IR
defined, for y ≥ 0, by
L`,τ (y, z, u, v, p, q) :=
∫
Ω
(
(2− `)1
r
ur + (`− 1)1
r
vr
)
dx
+
τ
2
N∑
i=1
(
β1`
∥∥yi − yi`,d∥∥2Hα(Ω) + β2`∥∥zi − zi`,d∥∥2Hα(Ω))
−τ
∫
Ω
p1
(y1 − u
τ
− d1∆y1 − ua
(
1− y
1
k
)
+ b
y1v
1 + eu
)
dx
−τ
N∑
i=2
∫
Ω
pi
(yi − yi−1
τ
− d1∆yi − yi−1a
(
1− y
i
k
)
+ b
yizi−1
1 + eyi−1
)
dx
−τ
∫
Ω
q1
(z1 − v
τ
− d2∆z1 − z1
(− c+ d y1
1 + ey1
))
dx
−τ
N∑
i=2
∫
Ω
qi
(zi − zi−1
τ
− d2∆zi − zi
(− c+ d yi
1 + eyi
))
dx.
We point out that here the integrals are denoting the duality pair 〈·, ·〉H10 (Ω)×H−1(Ω). The
adjoint system for the `-th player is [L`,τ ]
′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Let us denote p = pl and
q = ql to the solution of [L
τ
`,τ ]
′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Hence, in the classical formulation,
p` and q` are to solve the following system of linear elliptic boundary value problems:
(60) pN+1 = 0, qN+1 = 0,
and for i = N,N − 1, · · · , 1,
−p
i+1−pi
τ
− d1∆pi +
( bzi−1
1 + eyi−1
+ yi−1
a
k
)
pi −
( dzi
1 + eyi
− dez
iyi
(1 + eyi)2
)
qi
= pi+1a(1− y
i+1
k
) + bpi+1
eyi+1zi
(1 + eyi)2
+ β1`D
2α(yi − yi`,d) in Ω,
−q
i+1−qi
τ
− d2∆qi +
(
c− d y
i
1 + eyi
)
qi = −pi+1 by
i+1
1 + eyi
+ β2`D
2α(zi−zi`,d) in Ω,
pi = 0, qi = 0 on Γ;
(61)
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note that the undefined values of yN+1 and zN+1 are, in fact, irrelevant because of (60).
Remark 4.6. We point out that the above system of equations is a time discretization
of the adjoint system (17). Furthermore, if we know {yk}Nk=0, {zk}Nk=0, at each step we
have to solve two uncoupled elliptic problems.
By the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the formula for the Gaˆteaux dif-
ferential of the payoffs:
(62) [Φ`,τ ]
′(u, v) = [L`,τ ]′(u,v)(y, z, u, v, p`, q`) =
(
(2−`)ur−1 + p1`
+ τp1`
(
a
(
1− y
1
k
)
+
bey1v
(1+eu)2
)
, (`−1)vr−1 + q1` − τp1`
by1
1+eu
)
with (y, z) ∈ H10 (Ω)2N being the response on (u, v) and (p`, q`) solving the above system.
5. Full discretization
Still a spatial discretization of the recursive elliptic boundary-value problems (37) has to
be done. For this, we use the finite-element method with piecewise affine base functions.
We do not perform the (lengthy and technical) analysis of the corresponding fully discrete
case, mentioning only that Proposition 4.5 can be extended for this case, too.
We have to solve the following system of linear algebraic equations:
(63) y0 = u, z0 = v,
and for i = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
(64)

B
yi − yi−1
τ
+ d1Cy
i = aByi−1 − a
k
Bnl(y
i−1)yi − bBnl
(
zi−1
1 + eyi−1
)
yi,
B
zi − zi−1
τ
+ d2Cz
i = −cBzi + dBnl
(
yi
1 + eyi
)
zi,
where yi ∈ IRI×1, i = 0, 1, · · · , N are the coordinates of the fully discrete solution in the
nodal finite element basis (I denotes the dimension of such a basis), B ∈ IRI×I is the mass
matrix, C ∈ IRI×I is the stiffness matrix and Bnl(·) : IRI×1 → IRI×I is a function providing
suitable symmetric matrices for the nonlinear terms.
We approximate then the Nash Equilibrium problem (36) by the following fully dis-
cretized problem (we consider here the case α = 0):
(65)

Find a Nash Equilibrium of
J1,τ,h(y, z, u) :=
1
r
(ur−1)TBu
+
τ
2
N∑
i=1
(
β11(y
i − yi1,d)TB(yi − yi1,d) + β21(zi − zi1,d)TB(zi − zi1,d)
)
J2,τ (y, z, v) :=
1
r
(vr−1)TBv
+
τ
2
N∑
i=1
(
β12(y
i − yi2,d)TB(yi − yi2,d) + β22(zi − zi2,d)TB(zi − zi2,d)
)
,
where (u, v) ∈ Uh × Vh and y = {yi}Ni=1 and z = {zi}Ni=1 solve (63)–(64),
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where ur−1 denotes the vector in IRI×1 with all elements equal to the elements of vector
u to the power r − 1 (and analogously for vr−1).
For the fully discretized problem, the Lagrange function for the `-th player is the function
L`,τ,h : (IR
I×1)N × (IRI×1)N × IRI×1 × IRI×1 × (IR1×I)N × (IR1×I)N −→ IR
defined, for y ∈ (IRI×1)N such that yjk ≥ 0, j = 1, · · · , N , k = 1, · · · , I, by
L`,τ,h(y, z, u, v, p, q) := (2− `)1
r
(ur−1)TBu+ (`− 1)1
r
(vr−1)TBv
+
τ
2
N∑
i=1
(
β1`(y
i − yi`,d)TB(yi − yi`,d) + β2`(zi − zi`,d)TB(zi − zi`,d)
)
−τ
(
p1B
y1 − u
τ
+ d1p
1Cy1 − ap1Bu+ a
k
p1Bnl(u)y
1 + bp1Bnl
(
v
1 + eu
)
y1
)
−τ
N∑
i=2
(
piB
yi − yi−1
τ
+ d1p
iCyi − apiByi−1
+
a
k
piBnl(y
i−1)yi + bpiBnl
(
zi−1
1 + eyi−1
)
yi
)
−τ
(
q1B
z1 − v
τ
+ d2q
1Cz1 + cq1Bz1 − dq1Bnl
(
y1
1 + ey1
)
z1
)
−τ
N∑
i=2
(
qiB
zi − zi−1
τ
+ d2q
iCzi + cqiBzi − dqiBnl
(
yi
1 + eyi
)
zi
)
.
The adjoint system for the `-th player is [L`,τ ]
′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Let us denote
p = pl and q = ql to the solution of [L
τ
`,τ,h]
′
(y,z)(y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Hence, in the classical
formulation, p` and q` are to solve the following system of linear algebraic equations:
pN+1 = 0, qN+1 = 0,(66)
and for i = N,N − 1, · · · , 1,
−p
i+1 − pi
τ
B + d1p
iC +
a
k
piBnl(y
i−1) + bpiBnl
(
zi−1
1 + eyi−1
)
−d∇yi
(
qiBnl
(
yi
1 + eyi
)
zi
)
= api+1B − a
k
∇yi
(
pi+1Bnl(y
i)yi+1
)
−b∇yi
(
pi+1Bnl
(
zi
1 + eyi
)
yi+1
)
+ β1`(y
i − yi`,d)TB,
−q
i+1 − qi
τ
B + d2q
iC + cqiB − dqiBnl
(
yi
1 + eyi
)
= −b∇zi
(
pi+1Bnl
(
zi
1 + eyi
)
yi+1
)
+ β2`(z
i − zi`,d)TB;
(67)
note that the undefined values of yN+1 and zN+1 are, in fact, irrelevant because of (66).
Remark 5.1. We point out that the above system of equations is a space discretization
of the adjoint time discretized system 60–61 and therefore, a full discretization of the
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adjoint system (17). Furthermore, if we know {yk}Nk=0, {zk}Nk=0, at each step we have to
solve two uncoupled algebraic problems.
By the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the formula for the differential of
the payoffs:
(68) [Φ`,τ,h]
′(u, v) = [L`,τ,h]′(u,v)(y, z, u, v, p`, q`) =(
(2− `)(ur−1)TB + p1`B + aτp1`B −
a
k
τ∇u
(
p1`Bnl(u)y
1
)− bτ∇u(p1`Bnl( v1 + eu
)
y1
)
,
(`−1)(vr−1)TB + q1`B − bτ∇v
(
p1`Bnl
(
v
1 + eu
)
y1
))
with (y, z) ∈ (IRI×1)N × (IRI×1)N being the response on (u, v) in question and (p`, q`)
solves the above system.
6. Illustrative numerical examples
6.1. A controlled system and a game. For computational simulations, we consider the
one-dimensional test problem given by Ω = (0, 1), a = 1, b = 0.5, c = 3, d = .5, e = 0.05,
k = 20, d1 = 0.1, and d2 = 0.2. With these data, the associated Lotka-Volterra type
ODE system (i.e., in the absence of diffusion and boundary conditions) has a coexistence
equilibrium given by (ys, zs) ≈ (8.56, 1.6379) (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Phase diagram of the associated ODE system, for t ∈ [0, 30].
The data that we have taken for the functionals involved in the Nash equilibrium
problem are: T = 30, r = 2, y1,d = 8.56, z1,d = 0, y2,d = 0, z2,d = 1.6379, β11 = 1,
β22 = 100, β21 = β12 = 0, α = 0 and
umax(x) =
{
20 if 0.2 < x < 0.4,
0 elsewhere
and vmax(x) =
{
20 if 0.6 < x < 0.8,
0 elsewhere.
(69)
Therefore the players 1 and 2 want the response to be close to ys and zs, respectively,
taking also into account the cost of the implementation of their controls (in this case the
cost of the preys is much more expensive than that of the predators).
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Verification of the assumptions of Proposition 3.6 is however very difficult, and we do
not know whether the above data satisfy them, and henceforth we will proceed rather
“blindly”.
6.2. Nash equilibrium search algorithm. The existence of a constructive method to
solve the corresponding finite-dimensional game remains, to the best of our knowledge, an
open problem for general cases. In [21] a converging conjugate-gradient type algorithm
has been used for linear partial differential equations. For nonlinear systems with suitable
convex properties of the functionals involved (as those showed above) an iterative proce-
dure has been developed in [12], but it requires the minimization of a non-convex function
over compact domains, which is not well-suited for an implementation on the computer.
Anyhow, we propose the following conceptual algorithm to compute an approximate
solution of the Nash equilibrium problem:
Step 1. (u0, v0) is given in Uh × Vh, k := 0.
Step 2. Find uk+1 ∈ ArgminUhΦ1,τ (·, vk).
Step 3. Find vk+1 ∈ ArgminVhΦ2,τ (uk+1, ·).
Step 4. If
‖uk+1 − uk‖Lr
max{‖uk+1‖Lr , ‖uk‖Lr , 1} ≤ factr ∗ eps
and
‖vk+1 − vk‖Lr
max{‖vk+1‖Lr , ‖vk‖Lr , 1} ≤ factr ∗ eps
then stop else do k := k + 1 and go to Step 2.
After the stop, (uk+1, vk+1) is to be considered as an approximate Nash equilibrium. In
Step 4, eps and factr denote the machine precision of the computer and a control factor
for the stopping criteria, respectively. The value of eps can be taken directly from the
computer (typically eps≈ 10−16). Typical values for factr are: 1012 for low accuracy, 107
for moderate accuracy and 10 for extremely high accuracy. In all our numerical tests we
have used a personal computer with eps≈ 2.2204 10−16 and a control factor factr= 107.
We point out that u0 is seemingly unimportant but it is implicitly to be used as a
starting iteration for the iterative procedure solving the minimization problem in Step
2 for k = 0. Moreover, we point out that there is no proof of stopping of the above
iterative procedure for a finite k (we can even show a counterexample) even if some Nash
equilibrium does exist, but it follows a natural way which real systems are tempted for
reaching an equilibrium (although it does not always lead to it). That is why we expect
our algorithm to be convergent at least in “naturally qualified” situations. This procedure
has already been used (in a very similar form) in [22] and [20] for a pointwise control of
the Burgers equation.
To compute numerically a Nash equilibrium we have used the time discretization scheme
showed above, with N = 300, we have fully discretized the problem by using a Finite
Element Method, with linear finite elements of size h = 1/50 and we have used the above
proposed algorithm with factr= 107. Of course, the minimization of Φ1,τ (·, v) and of
Φ2,τ (u, ·) can be solved only approximately because these functionals are not quadratic
unless a trivial non-interesting case a = b = d = 0. Here we use a subspace trust region
method, which is based on the interior-reflective Newton method described in [3], [4].
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This method requires only the values of Φ1,τ and Φ2,τ and their first derivatives
∂
∂u
Φ1,τ
and ∂
∂v
Φ2,τ given by the full discretization of (62).
6.3. Numerical test. For the numerical test we have used N = 300 and I = 49.
If we start with u0 ≡ 8.56 on (0.2, 0.4) and v0 ≡ 1.6379 on (0.6, 0.8), Figures 2–3
show the solutions (y, z) for the corresponding initial conditions (u, v) := (u0, v0), still
without minimizing any functional. They show the typical oscillatory solutions of the
Lotka-Volterra type systems, around the coexistence equilibrium.
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Figure 2. Graphic of y(t, x)
when u = u0 ≡ 8.56 on (0.2, 0.4)
and v = v0 ≡ 1.6379 on (0.6, 0.8).
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Figure 3. Graphic of z(t, x)
when u ≡ 8.56 on (0.2, 0.4) and
v ≡ 1.6379 on (0.6, 0.8).
Figures 4–5 show the solutions (y, z) for the initial conditions (u, v) := (u6, v6) corre-
sponding to the computed Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4. Graphic of y(t, x) when
(u, v) = (u6, v6) are the computed
Nash equilibrium on (0.2, 0.4).
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Figure 5. Graphic of z(t, x) when
(u, v) = (u6, v6) are the computed
Nash equilibrium on (0.6, 0.8).
Figures 6–7 show the graphs of ‖y(t) − y1,d‖2 and ‖z(t) − z2,d‖2, respectively, where
(y, z) are the solution corresponding to the initial conditions (u0, v0) (the full line: —)
and to (u6, v6) (the dashed line: - - -).
Table 1 shows the value of the payoff functionals at each iteration.
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Figure 6. Graphic of ‖y(t)−y1,d‖2
for (u0, v0) (—) and (u6, v6) (- - -).
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Figure 7. Graphic of ‖z(t)−z2,d‖2
for (u0, v0) (—) and (u6, v6) (- - -).
Φ1 Φ2
k=0 187.6703 1.6118 e+3
k=1 176.3443 1.3203 e+3
k=2 152.6978 1.3223 e+3
k=3 152.6806 1.3224 e+3
k=4 152.6799 1.3224 e+3
k=5 152.6799 1.3224 e+3
k=6 152.6799 1.3224 e+3
Table 1. Value of the payoff functionals at each iteration.
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